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In this paper, a worker’s productivity is assumed to depend on his own quality and on the
average quality of other employed workers. In this setting, unemployment benefits that induce low
quality workers to leave the labor force have important efficiency as well as equity implications. In
addition to unemployment benefits, the authorities can use a proportional income tax and lump
sum transfers. The desirability of tax and transfer policy is considered from the perspectives of a
utilitarian social planner, and of an electorate consisting of employed and unemployed workers.
Employed workers may be in favor of unemployment benefits, even though they do not benefit
directly. If unemployment benefits are financed by lump sum taxes, then relatively high unem-
ployment benefits may be favored by a coalition of the unemployed and of high quality employed
workers.
1 I thank Petra Geraats for useful comments on an earlier draft.1. Introduction
Unemployment benefit schemes have been explained by Bailey (1978) and Fleming (1978) as
insurance against the risk of job loss. Boadway and Oswald (1983) and Wright (1985) have
considered the political economy aspects of such insurance. Zeckhauser (1971) and Cooter and
Helpman (1974), among others, alternatively rationalize transfer payments to the non-working poor
as acts of altruism. This paper offers a third rationale for unemployment benefits stemming from
the fact that exits by relatively unproductive workers from the work force may in fact increase the
productivity of remaining workers. This is the case if there are peer group effects in the work place
in the sense that a worker’s productivity depends on the quality of his co-workers as well as on
this own quality. Henderson, Mieszkowski and Sauvageau (1978) and Arnott and Rowse (1987)
argue that such peer groups are important in the class room setting, and they suggest that peer
group effects may equally be important in the work place. Along similar lines, Sala-i-Martin
(1992) introduces labor productivity externalities to explain mandatory retirement of older workers
in a growth context.
Huizinga (1994) considers tax and transfer policy in a model of labor quality externalities for
the case where the tax authorities have two fiscal instruments: (i) lump sum unemployment
benefits, and (ii) proportional labor income taxes. This paper extends Huizinga (1994) by
introducing a third fiscal instrument: a lump sum tax (or transfer) to all workers regardless of their
employment status. With this wider instrument set, the tax authorities can influence workers’
employment status as well as their individual labor effort when employed. The paper analyses and
contrasts the three variants of the model where only two of the three policy instruments are
available. The subcases where only two instruments exist are analysed for their own sake and to
make the analysis comparable to earlier contributions on unemployment benefits and redistributive
taxation. Finally, the case where all three policy instruments exist is also considered. Throughout,
tax and transfer policy is examined from the perspective of a utilitarian social planner and of an
electorate consisting of the universe of employed and unemployed workers.
If the policy set consists of universal lump sum transfers financed by proportional income
taxation, then the model is very similar to Meltzer and Richards (1981). Lump sum transfers
financed by labor income taxes will be favored by the median voter, if this voter has a lower than
1average labor income. Secondly, we consider the case where the instrument set consists of lump
sum transfers to the unemployed financed by universal lump sum taxes. In this scenario, unem-
ployment compensation generally benefits unemployed workers, who are direct beneficiaries, and
the most qualified employed workers, who stand to gain the most on account of the peer group
effect. As a result, a coalition of the unemployed and the highly qualified employed may support
higher unemployment benefits than those preferred by the median quality worker.
As a third case, the instrument set consists of unemployment benefits financed by proportional
labor income taxes. In this instance, the benefits and costs of higher unemployment benefits to
employed workers are both shown to be proportional to individual labor quality (and income). As a
result, all employed workers have equal preferences over different combinations of unemployment
compensation and labor income taxes. The unemployed, of course, are simply interested in
obtaining the maximum net-of-tax unemployment benefits. The unemployed as a group thus also
have identical preferences over feasible pairs of unemployment compensation and labor income
taxation. The employed and the unempoyed thus will vote as separate blocs if tax and transfer
policy is determined by elections. In this setting, equilibrium policy is determined by the median
quality worker, after he has chosen whether he is better off as an employed worker or as an
unemployed worker.
Finally, the policy set is assumed to consist of all three instruments: universal taxes or
transfers, transfers to only the unemployed, and proportional income taxation. It is shown that there
is a unique voting equilibrium, if the median quality worker can achieve highest utility as an
unemployed individual. Unemployment benefits and labor income taxes are further demonstrated to
be complementary in the sense that, starting from a political equilibrium where unemployment
benefits exist, more people favor positive labor income taxation than in the absence of unemploy-
ment benefits.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic model. Secti-
on 3 considers the three cases where the policy instrument set consists of two of the three
instruments examined in the paper. Section 4 in contrast considers the case where all three
instruments are at the authorities’ disposal. Finally, section 5 concludes by drawing attention to the
fact that the model is highly stylized. Several extensions are proposed that potentially affect the
2model’s basic implications.
2. The model
There is a fixed population of workers that are heterogeneous in their quality. Worker quality,
denoted a, can be in part innate and in part the result of education.
1 The variable a is distributed
on the interval [a,a ]with density function f(a) and distribution function F(a). The size of the
population is unity so that F(a) = 1. The population mean value of a is denoted Workers can µ.
choose to be employed or to be unemployed. Let S be the share of the population that is employed,
which implies that 1-Sis the unemployment rate. The mean quality of employed workers is
denoted µ. All workers have 1 unit of time available. Individuals who are employed have to decide
how much to work and how much leisure to consume. Let individual labor supply be denoted x so
that leisure equals 1-x . On account of peer group effects, the productivity of any worker depends
positively on the mean quality of all employed workers, µ. Peer group effects may exist because
workers can learn from and copy relatively highly qualified workers, or they may be purely
psychological. Individual output, denoted y, is related to individual worker quality, a, the mean













where a ^ is the borderline quality of a worker, if any, who is indifferent between working and not
working.
3Equation (2) displays what can be called increasing returns to average quality, as national
output, Y, increases more than linearly with mean worker quality, µ, while there are only constant
returns to scale, S.
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Individuals derive utility from consumption and from leisure. Let C be the level of
consumption, and let aV(1 - x) be the subutility derived from leisure, with V ’>0 ,V ’ ’<0 . This
specification reflects the assumption that a worker’s enjoyment of leisure increases with his quality,
a. The overall utility measure, denoted U, is assumed to be separable in consumption and leisure as
follows,
U=C+aV(1 - x) (3)
Let us now consider the policy instruments at the disposal of the fiscal authorities. As is
usual, the government cannot observe or tax worker quality directly. A worker’s employment
status, however, is observable, and thus the goverment can implement a lump sum transfer, b,t o
only unemployed workers. Also, the government can tax labor income at a flat rate t. For purposes
of taxation, unemployment benefits are considered labor income. To balance the budget, the
government finally provides a lump sum transfer, t, to all citizens regardless of their employment
status. If negative, t represents a lump sum tax.
Employed workers have to decide how much they will work. The optimality condition
regarding individual labor supply, x, if positive is as follows,
V ’ ( 1-x )=( 1-t )µ
a (4)
Equation (4) reflects that individual labor supply, x, is independent of worker quality, a.A
worker obtains utilities, Ue and Uu, if employed and unemployed, respectively. These two utility
levels are given as follows,
Ue =( 1-t ) y+aV ( 1-x )+t (5)
4Uu =( 1-t ) b+aV ( 1 )+t (6)
where in (5) individual labor supply x is chosen optimally.
Equations (5) and (6) reflect that employed and unemployed workers receive net labor
incomes equal to (1 - t)y and (1 - t)b, respectively.
An individual worker of quality a chooses to work if Ue in (5) exceeds Uu in (6), and vice
versa. Setting Ue =U u from (5) and (6) implies that this borderline quality level, a ^, is given
implicitly as follows,
(1 - t)b + a ^V ( 1 )=( 1-t )x^ aµ
a+^ aV ( 1-x ) (7)
All workers of quality higher (lower) than a ^ clearly choose (not) to work. The labor
participation rate, S, is now given by 1-F ( ^ a), while the unemployment rate equals F(^ a).
From equations (6) and (7), we can derive how the unemployment benefit level, b, and the
income tax rate, t, affect individual labor supply, x, and the threshold worker quality level, a ^,
given that some workers are unemployed. Qualitatively, the relationships between the fiscal










Exact expressions for the derivatives in (8) are provided in the Appendix. Equation (8) first
indicates that a higher benefit, b, increases the threshold quality level, a ^, as a higher value of b
induces the lowest qualified employed workers to exit from the work force. The resulting increase
in the mean quality of remaining workers, µ, increases the productivity of remaining workers and,
as seen in (8), their labor supply, x. Turning to the income tax rate, we see in (8) that a higher tax
rate, t, also increases the threshold quality level, a ^. To understand this, note that employed workers
receive relatively much labor income, and enjoy relatively little leisure. The labor income tax, t,
thus is borne relatively heavily by employed workers, and as a result it discourages the labor
participation of marginal workers. Finally, we see in (8) that a higher labor income tax rate, t,
5reduces individual labor supply, x.
It is interesting to consider how the unemployment benefit, b, and the tax rate, t, affect
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Using the qualitative expressions in (8), we see that higher unemployment benefits, b, lead
to higher aggregate output, Y,i fa ^<a µ / (1 + a). This condition is more easily satisfied, the larger
is the parameter a that reflects the strength of the relationship between individual output, y, and
mean worker quality, µ, in (1). Equation (10) indicates that a higher labor income tax rate, t, can
lead to a higher aggregate output, Y. In the limiting case where labor supply, x, is completely
inelastic, for instance, we see that a ^<a µ / (1 + a) is a necessary and a sufficient condition for a
higher income tax, t, to lead to higher aggregate output, Y. These results are summarized as
follows,
Proposition 1: A sufficient condition for dY/db > 0 is a ^<a µ/(1 + a). The latter condition is a
necessary and sufficient condition for dY/dt >0 , if individual labor supply, x, is inelastic.
Next, let us consider the government budget. Let B be the government budget surplus.
Formally, B is given as follows,
B=tY-( 1-t ) b ( 1-S )-t (11)
It is interesting to consider tax and redistributive policy, as determined by a social planner,
as a benchmark. The social planner is assumed to have a utilitarian social welfare function, Us,











Alternatively, we will assume that fiscal policy is determined by popular vote. In a voting
equilibrium, policy reflects the preferences of a decisive voter who, as we will see, may not be the
worker of median worker quality. In all cases, however, the decisive voter is either employed or
unemployed. A decisive voter thus wishes to maximize either Ue in (5) or Uu in (6). Whatever
policy instruments are availabe, any equilibrium policy is thus always set so as to maximize Us, Ue,
or Uu, subject to the government budget constraint that To facilitate the later analysis, the B ³ 0.
remainder of this section states the optimality conditions for a social planner, an employed worker,
and an unemployed worker who maximize Us, Ue, and Uu, respectively, subject to Sections B ³ 0.
3 and 4 then deduce the implications of these optimality conditions for equilibrium tax and transfer
policy in various variants of the general model.
The social planner is interested in maximizing the Lagrangian expression Ls =U s+l B ,
where l is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government budget constraint. Note that if a
> 0, then unemployment benefits, b, also have to be positive to induce any individuals to leave the
labor force. Let b be the unemployment benefit level such that workers of quality a are indifferent
between working and not working. For any workers to exit from the labor force, we needb ³ b.
The optimality conditions of a social planner’s maximization problem with respect to t, b, and t
are now as follows,
dLs
dt
Y b(1 S) a(1 t)Y µ ˆ a
µS





or t =0 (13a)
dLs
db
(1 t)(1 S) a(1 t)Y µ ˆ a
µS
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] ³ 0
and where use is made of the fact that dB/dt=-1 .
An employed worker instead is interested in maximizing the Lagrangian expression Le =
Ue + lB. The optimality conditions associated with this maximization problem with respect to t, b,
and t are as follows,
or t =0 (14a)
dLe
dt
y a(1 t)y µ ˆ a
µS
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Finally, an unemployed individual is interested in maximizing the Lagrangian expression Lu
=U u+l B . The resulting optimality conditions with respect to t, b, and t are as follows,
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In the remainder of this paper, we examine the implications for the setting of tax and
redistributive policy of the sets of optimality conditions (13), (14), and (15).
3. The determination of policy with a limited set of policy instruments
This section considers the three cases where the policy instrument set consists of only two
instruments in turn. The three cases are considered in three subsections.
3.1 Only income taxation and lump sum transfers available
In this subsection, we consider that the proportional income tax at a rate t and lump sum
transfers, t, are the only policy instruments in existence. In the absence of unemployment benefits,
all workers are employed. First, we can consider that the policy instruments, t and t, are set by a
social planner, as guided by optimality conditions (13a) and (13c). From (13c), we see that dLs/dt
=0implies l =1 .Noting l =1 , we see from (13a) that optimally t =0 .
3 This implies that a
social planner optimally will not use income taxation to redistribute income. This is because
income taxes only distort the labor supply decision without any offsetting benefits in terms of
higher social welfare.
4 Next, let us consider what is the optimal policy from the perspective of an
employed agent. For an employed person of quality a, the optimality conditions are (14a) and
(14c). Again (14c) implies that l =1 .Noting this, we can solve from the optimal income tax rate,
t
*(a), for an agent of quality a from (14a) as follows,










9If second order conditions hold, there is a unique value of t as in (16) that maximizes
individual welfare and each agent’s preferences over values of t are single-peaked. From (16), we
can infer that the optimal value of t from an individual worker’s perspective declines with his
quality, a. In this instance, the median voter is the worker of median quality, denoted am. This
result can be stated as follows,
Proposition 2: If lump sum transfer, t, are financed by income taxation at a rate, t, then the voting
equilibrium reflects the preferences of the median voter who is the median quality worker. This
voter favors positive values of the income tax, t, and the transfer, t, if his quality, am, is less than
the mean quality, µ.
3.2 Only unemployment benefits and lump sum taxes available
In this subsection, we consider the case where unemployment benefits, b, and lump sum
transfers, t, are the available policy instruments. To start, we will consider the welfare implications
of unemployment benefits just high enough to induce the lowest quality workers to exit from the
labor force. Again, we will consider such unemployment benefits from the perspectives of a social
planner, an employed individual, and an unemployed individual. For the social planner, the
relevant first order conditions are (13b) and (13c). The social planner favors the introduction of






According to (17), the social planner favors unemployment benefits, if the social producti-
vity externality resulting from the exit of a worker of quality a exceeds the unemployment benefit
b. It can be shown that (17) is satisfied if
5 Next, we consider the dermination µ/a>( 1 a )/a .
of unemployment benefits from the perspective of an employed individual, guided by first order
10conditions (14b) and (14c). An employed person of quality a is in favor of non-trivial unemploy-





A worker of quality a favors the introduction of unemployment benefits, if the increase in
his own productivity resulting from labor market exists exceeds the unemployment benefit level, b.
As individual output, y, is proportional to labor quality, a, it follows from (18) that workers of
quality higher than a certain minimum level (if any) will support non-trivial unemployment
benefits. Equation (18) implies, however, that the introduction of unemployment benefits financed
by a lump sum tax may harm the lowest qualified employed workers.
6 The interests of lowly and
highly qualified employed workers thus generally diverge, if unemployment benefits, b, are
financed by a lump sum tax, t.
Finally, we can consider whether the introduction of non-trivial employment benefits
actually benefits the people rendered unemployed. To check this, note that an unemployed person’s
relevant optimality conditions are (15b) and (15c). The lowest qualified individuals, of quality a,
benefit from the introduction of non-trivial unemployment benefits if,
(19) 1 bf ( a) dˆ a
db
>0
Equation (19) essentially indicates that the lowest quality unemployed benefit from higher
unemployment benefits if the increase in the unemployment benefits exceeds the increase in the
lump sum tax necessary to finance the higher unemployment benefits. A sufficient condition for
(19) to be satisfied is
7 The above results on the desirability of unemployment benefits f(a)a<1 .
are summarized as follows,
Proposition 3: The introduction of low unemployment benefits, financed by lump sum taxation on
all, (i) may or may not benefit those rendered unemployed and lowly qualifed employed workers,
and (ii) it benefits employed workers of quality higher than a certain threshold level (if any).
11Next, we in turn consider the optimal level of unemployment benefits from the perspecti-
ves of a social planner, an employed worker and an unemployed worker. Starting with the social
planner, we can solve from equation (13b) and (13c) for the socially optimal unemployment
benefit level financed by lump sum taxation, bt,s
*, as follows,
(20) bt,s a Y µ ˆ a
µS
Similarly, the optimal unemployment benefit from the perspective of an employed worker
of quality a, bt,e
*(a), can be found from (14b) and (14c) as follows,














The first term on the right of (21) is simlar to expression (20). Expression (21), however,
reflects that each worker is interested in how unemployment benefits affect his own output, y,
rather than aggregate output, Y. Also expression (21) has a negative final term which reflects that
an employed person, unlike the social planner, does not value increases in the benefit income of
the unemployed per se.
Finally, we can solve for the optimal unemployment benefit from the perspective of all
unemployed workers, bt,u






The optimal unemployment benefit increases with the employed share of the population, S,
that can help finance the unemployment benefits without being at the same time beneficiaries.
Before we consider voting on unemployment benefits, we have to examine agents’ prefe-
rences over values of the unemployment benefits, as either employed or unemployed workers. To
this end, let Ue(bt,a) be the welfare reached by agents of quality a as employed workers given that
12unemployment benefits, b, are financed by a lump sum tax, t. The utility index, Ue(bt,a), presuppo-
ses that the agent of quality a chooses individual labor supply optimally, while all other agents
choose their employment status and labor supply optimally. We see immediately from (5) that dU-
e(bt,a)/da > 0. At the same time, we know from (21) that the optimal value of b, bt,e
*(a) increases
with a, provided bt,e
*(a) exceeds b. The index Ue(bt,a) is presented in Figure 1 for two worker
quality levels a1 and a2, with a2 >a 1. The figure reflects the assumption that an agent’s preferences
as an employed worker over different levels of unemployment benefits, b, are single-peaked.
Next, we can define Uu(bt,a) to be the welfare obtained by agents of quality a as unem-
ployed workers given that benefits, b, are financed by a lump sum tax, t. Again all other workers
are assumed to have chosen their employment status and their individual labor supply, x, optimally.
Using (6), we see that dUu(bt,a)/da = V(1), which is independent of quality a. This confirms the
result from (22) that the optimal unemployment benefit, bt,u
*, from an unemployed worker’s
perspective, is independent of the transfer b. Figure 2 represents the index Uu(bt,a) for two worker
quality levels a1 and a2, with a2 >a 1 . We assume that an agent’s preferences as an unemployed
worker over different levels of unemployment benefits, b, are single-peaked.
A worker of quality a chooses to be employed if Ue(b,a) > Uu(b,a) and vice versa. In fact,
for any benefit level, b, there is a borderline quality level , above (below) which agents choose to ˆ a
be (un)employed according to (7). Note that a worker’s ability to change his employment status
implies that preferences over different levels of employment benefits, b are generally double-
peaked, even if preferences as either an employed or an unemployed worker are single-peaked. In
fact, an agent’s preferences are double-peaked, if (i) bt,e
*(a) < bt,u
*, and (ii) the worker decides to
become unemployed at a benefit level below bt,u
*.
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In this case of generally double-peaked preferences, there may still be a unique voting
outcome. To see whether this is the case, we proceed as follows. We first consider what would be
the outcome preferred by the median quality voter. Then we consider whether this solution can be
beaten by a direct comparison with another outcome, and if so how. We now have to consider
three cases: (i) Ue(bt,e
*(am),am) > Uu(bt,u
*,am) and , (ii) Ue(bt,e
*(am),am) > Uu(bt,u
*,am) and bt,e(am) ³bt,u
and (iii) Ue(bt,e
*(am),am)U u (bt,u
*,am). In case (i), the median quality worker prefers bt,e(am)< b t,u £
to be employed at a benefit level exceeding bu
*. Now all (employed) workers with a>a mwish to
13have higher benefits, while all workers with a<a m , whether employed or unemployed, wish to
have lower benefits. In this instance, the median quality worker’s wishes are implemented. Case
(ii) is somewhat more complicated. Now workers with a>a m , who are employed, as before, wish
to increase the benefit level beyond bt,e
*(am). This is also the case for unemployed workers, as
. It follows that more than half the electorate is in favor of a small increase in b bt,e(am)< b t,u
beyond bt,e
*(am). Thus the outcome preferred by the median quality worker cannot be a voting
equilibrium. A complicating matter to determine possible voting outcomes in this case is that the
coalition in favor of marginal increases in b may either decline or increase, as previously employed
join the ranks of the unemployed who are in favor of higher values of b. As a result the existence
of multiple voting equilibria cannot be excluded. Any equibrium, however, will be larger than
bt,e
*(am) and less than or equal to bt,u
*. Finally, in case (iii) the median quality worker attains
highest welfare at a benefit level bt,u
*. This will be strictly the case for all agents with a<a m .I n
this case, the benefit level bt,u
* is the unique voting outcome.
The most interesting result is, perhaps, that in case (ii) the median quality worker can be
outvoted by a coalition of highly qualified employed workers and unemployed workers in order to
increase the benefit level. This result is summarized as follows,
Proposition 4: If the median quality worker reaches highest utility as an employed person for a
benefit level below bt,u
*, then a coalition of the unemployed and of highly qualified employed
workers will be able to implement a benefit level higher than the one preferred by the median
quality worker.
This result indicates a potential conflict of interest between the lowly qualified employed
and the highly qualified employed over the desired level of benefits. Underlying this conflict is the
fact that higher benefits, in terms of higher individual productivity, accrue in proportional to an
employed person’s quality, while the tax burden, in the form of a lump sum tax, is equal for all
employed workers. In the next subsection, we instead consider unemployment benefits that are
financed through a proportional tax on labor income. Labor income for employed workers, in turn,
is proportional to labor quality. In this case, the benefits and costs of higher unemployment
14benefits for all employed workers are proportional to labor quality. As a result, there no longer is a
potential conflict of interest among employed workers.
3.3 Only unemployment benefits and income taxes available
In this subsection, unemployment benefits, b, are financed only by a proportional tax, t,o n
labor income. The discussion in this subsection closely follows Huizinga (1994). Let Ue(bt,a) now
be the welfare of an individual of quality a as an employed worker if benefits, b, are financed by a
labor income tax, t. As before, we assume that all agents of quality other than a have chosen their
employment status and their individual labor supply, x, optimally. It is immediate that Ue(bt,a) is
proportional to labor quality a, which implies that Ue(bt,a) reaches a maximum for a value of b
that is independent of a. Analogously, let Uu(bt,a) be the utility of an agent of quality a as an
unemployed worker. Using the expression for Uu in (6), we see that Uu(bt,a) reaches a maximum
for value of b and t that are independent of a. Let bt,u
* (bt,e
*) now be the value of b and tu
* ( te
* )
the tax rate that maximizes Uu(bt,a) ( Ue(bt,a) ) for all workers. We can obtain the following
result,
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Proposition 5: All agents prefer a higher benefit and tax rate as an unemployed worker than as an





Again, the welfare indices Ue(bt,a) and Uu(bt,a) are assumed to be single-peaked in b.
Agents can change their employment status, however, and, therefore, overall preferences over
values of b generally are double-peaked. Individual preferences, specifically, are double-peaked for
those agents that change their employment status for a value of b between bt,e
* and bt,u
*.
In this model, the voting outcome will always reflect the preferences of the median voter.
To see this, let us assume that the median quality worker prefers to be unemployed at a benefit
level bt,u
*. It is straightforward that all workers with a<a malso prefer to be unemployed at the
same benefit level. Alternatively, the median quality worker can prefer to work at a benefit level
bt,e
*. In this instance, all workers with a>a malso prefer to work at the same benefit level. These
results are summarized as follows,
15Proposition 6: If the unemployment income, b, is financed by a proportional income tax, t, then if
the median quality worker prefers to be (un)employed at a benefit level bt,e
* (bt,u
*) so will all
workers of higher (lower) quality. As a result, the voting outcome reflects the preferences of the
median quality worker.
Interestingly, the median voter can be indifferent between working and not working if
Uu(bt,u
*,a) = Ue(bt,e
*,a). In this instance, the outcome of the vote is not unique. More specifically,
bt,e
* and bt,u
* are possible voting outcomes regarding the unemployment benefit level. While the
median quality worker may be indifferent between the two possible voting outcomes, this is not the
case for other workers. Workers of higher (lower) quality than the median quality worker, in
particular, prefer the lower (higher) level of unemployment benefits. Note that the indifference
between the two voting outcomes on the part of the median quality worker is fragile in the sense
that a small change in the composition of the population can change the indifference by the median
quality worker between the two outcomes. Small changes in the population, for instance resulting
from migration, thus can bring about a large change in the unemployment benefit system with
discrete changes in welfare for all but the median ability worker.
10
4 All three instruments available
In this section, all three fiscal instruments, b, t and t, are available. As in section 3.1, the
social planner will never use the income tax instrument, t. Employed and unemployed persons,
however, generally wish to employ all three instruments, if decisions where left to the individual.
This section addresses two issues. First, starting from a voting equilibrium where only unemploy-
ment benefits, b, and lump sum taxes, t, exist, we address whether voters will favor the introducti-
on of proportional income taxes. Second, we consider the issue of the voting equilibrium where all
three fiscal instruments are available. At least in specific cases, we can say what the voting
equilibrium entails.
Starting with the first issue, let us assume that there exists a voting equilibrium in the
unemployment benefit level, b, and the lump sum tax, t. Which voters will be in favor of a
positive level of the income tax rate, t? Proposition 2 states that in the absence of unemployment
16benefits all voters of lower than the mean quality favor positive income taxes. Here we show that a
broader segment of the population favors such an introduction if unemployment benefits are
already is in place. Specifically, we can state the following results,
Proposition 7 (i):I fband t be chosen optimally from the perspective of an unemployed worker,
such that b ,t>0 , then this unemployed person favors a positive income tax rate, t. (ii): Let b and
t instead be chosen optimally from the perspective of an employed person of quality a such that b,
t>0 . This employed person can then benefit from a positive income tax level, if a<( 1-S )a ^+
Sµ. The median quality worker, of quality am, specifically benefits from such an introduction if am
<( 1-S )a ^+S µ .
Comparing propositions 2 and 7, we see that the median voter is in favor of introducing
positive labor income taxes under broader conditions if b, t >0than if b=t=0 ,a s(1 - S) a ^+
Sµ In this sense, unemployment benefits and proportional income taxation are shown to be > µ.
complementary.
To conclude this section, we consider how preferences of employed and unemployed
workers over policy choices generally diverge, and the implication for voting in the case where all
three instruments are available. We can state the following results,
Proposition 8 (i): If the three instruments are set so as to maximize the welfare of any unemployed
agent, then all employed workers wish to implement lower values of b and of t. (ii): If the three
instruments are instead set so as to maximize the welfare of an employed agent of quality a’, then
(first) all employed agents of quality a>a ’wish to increase b and to reduce t, and (second) all
employed agents of quality a<a ’wish to reduce b and to increase t, and (third) all unemployed
agents wish to increase b and t.
If the median quality worker obtains highest welfare by being unemployed, then this is also
the case for all workers of lower quality. In this instance, the median quality worker is the median
voter and there is a unique voting equilibrium. Alternatively, the median quality worker can obtain
17highest welfare as an employed worker. As in section 3.2, there now is generally a majority
coalition of unemployed and of highly qualified employed workers that wishes to increase the
value of the benefit, b, for a given value of t. The policy configuration preferred by the median
quality worker thus cannot be a voting equilibrium. Voting for this case is not further pursued
here.
5. Conclusion
This paper starts from the premise that a worker’s productivity depends on his own quality
as well as on the quality of other employed workers. As a result, the model displays what can be
called increasing returns to average quality: the output of a group of workers increases more than
linearly with the average worker quality. A main feature of the model is that a system of
unemployment benefits to low quality workers so as to remove them from the labor market can
increase total output. In this setting, unemployment compensation has the dual role of effecting
efficient exists from the labor market and of redistributing income. The political process takes both
aspects of the transfer system into account. The paper considers policy as determined by a social
planner and by majority voting.
11 A main result of the paper is that it may be in the interest of
employed workers to support unemployment benefits. This result is consistent with the reality that
many countries have unemployment schemes, while the majority of voting age individuals do not
receive unemployment benefits.
While the present model rationalizes unemployment compensation, it cannot be taken to
imply that any large-scale unemployment is in fact socially desirable. This reflects that the model
is highly stylized in at least two respects: (i) the model is entirely static, and (ii) workers can only
be employed in a sector characterized by labor market externalities or be unemployed. This negates
that in practice workers may temporarily engage in training before entering or reentering the work
place.
At the same time, real economies consist of many sectors that are characterized by labor
quality externalities to different extents. To reflect this, the model could include an additional
sector without any labor quality externalities at all. In this second sector, a worker’s product could
simply equal their own individual quality, or it could be a constant for all employed workers. In
18the second instance, employment in this second sector is immediately analogous to unemployment
in the present model. In this amended model, there remains a scope for tax policy to affect the
allocation of workers between the two sectors, even if all workers are employed. More generally,
there is a scope for tax and transfer policy to affect employment in all the economy’s sectors as
well as unemployment.
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a µ ˆ a
µS
f(ˆ a) > 0
Proof of proposition 7:
Part (i):
We wish to show that all unemployed workers can benefit from a positive value of t. This
is the case if dLu/dt >0in (15a) for t =0given that dLu/db = 0 in (15b). Thus we need to show
that,
b Y b(1 S) S dˆ a/dt
dˆ a/db
>0
where has been substituted for form (15b) into (15a). S
dˆ a/db
bf(ˆ a)
After substituting for and from (A3) and (A1), we get, dˆ a/dt dˆ a/db
-b+Y+b ( 1-S )+Sa ^( V(1 - x) - V(1) ) =
20Y-S[b-a ^(V(1 - x) - V(1)) ] = (using (7))
Y-S[ xa ^µ
a ]= (using (2))
Sxµ
a(µ - a ^ )>0.
Part (ii):
We wish to show that agents of quality a lower than (1 - S)a ^+S µcan benefit from a
positive value of t,i fbis set so as to maximize the welfare of an employed worker. Thus, we
need to show that dLe/dt >0for t =0in (16a) given that dLe/db and l = 1 in (14b).
This is the case if,
y Y b(1 S) (1 S) dˆ a/dt
dˆ a/db
>0








ay µ ˆ a
µS
bf ( ˆ a)
Substituting from (A1) and (A3), we get,
-y+Y+b ( 1-S )+( 1-S )a ^ (V ( 1 )-V ( 1-x ))= (using (7))
- y+Y+b ( 1-S )-( 1-S )[b-x a ^µ
a ] = (using (2))
xµ
a[-a+( 1-S ) a ^ + Sµ ]
This shows that an individual of quality a can benefit from a positive income tax, t,i fa<
( 1-S ) a ^+S µ .
21Proof of proposition 8:
Part (i):
Proposition 5 states that an employed person wishes lower values of b as well as of t for
the case of t=0 . With t=0 , the l’s in eq. (14a, b) and (15a, b) are generally different from 1.
However, the proof remains valid if t ¹ 0, which implies l is equal to 1 in (14a, b) and (15a, b).
Part (ii):












1 a(1 t) µ ˆ a
µS
f(ˆ a) dˆ a
dt
Noting that dy/da = xµ








[ˆ a[V(1) V(1 x)] (1 t)xˆ aµ








b/ˆ a axˆ aµ




Noting that â[V(1) - V(1 - x)] - (1 - t)x â µ







aa(1 t) µ ˆ a
µS
f(ˆ a) dˆ a
db
>0
These two derivatives imply the first and second statements. The third statement
is the mirror image of part (i) of this proposition. The proof is therefore analogous.
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23Endnotes
1. The description of the basic model draws heavily on Huizinga (1994).
2. Kremer (1993) analyses an alternative production function characterized by labor quality
externalities. Production, in particular, is assumed to consist of a number of tasks that all
have to be completed successfully for the produced output to have any value.












4. Income redistribution per se does not yield higher social welfare, as consumption, C,
enters the utility specification in (3) linearly.
5. Using (2) and the expression for , we see that (17) is equivalent to, b
[aµ (1 a)a]xµ
a a[V (1) V(1 x) ] > 0
6. To see this, note that we can substitute for y from (1) and for into (18) to reach, b
a a(µ a) aµ
µ
xµ
a a[V(1) V(1 x)] > 0
The above inequality is not satisfied if, for instance, with a < 1 and V(1) = V(1 - x) a a
=0 .
7. To check this, note that (19) is equivalent to,
[xµ





8. A sufficient condition for double-peakedness is that an employed agent loses from
unemployment benefits that are increased from the minimum level . b
9. For a proof, see Huizinga (1994).
10. Huizinga (1994) analyses how an influx of quality workers of mimimum quality affects the
tax and transfer system if there are unemployment benefits financed by a proportional
labor income tax. At some point a discrete drop in both the unemployment benefit and the
tax rate occurs as the decisive voter is better off being employed than being unemployed.
11. Alternatively, it may be interesting to consider policy as affected by pressure groups in the
present model.See Kirstov, Lindert and McClelland (1992) for a recent analysis of
pressure groups as they affect redistribution.
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